"Floating is not a well-defined monetary policy. If the central bank doesn't fix the exchange rate, it has to do something else-but what? The academic profession should move away from considering 'Exchange Rate Regimes' and instead classify countries by 'Monetary Policy Frameworks'."
Rose (2011)
Introduction
Monetary policy is arguably one of the most important tools for government to influence the economy. Economists and policy-makers have long sought the ideal framework for monetary policy. Three nominal variables-namely exchange rate, monetary aggregate and inflation, have been suggested to be the most appealing anchors and are widely studied 1 . Contrary to the long-established record on exchange rate arrangements, however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) compiles a comprehensive classification on monetary policy regimes for its members in recent years only 2 .
Several studies in the inflation targeting literature, including Ball and Sheriden (2005) , Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) , Carare and Stone (2006) , Cottarelli and Giannini (1997) , Fatas et al. (2007) , Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) , have extended the identification of inflation targeters to a longer period and a larger group of countries. Most of these works, including the classification of the IMF have used the announcement of inflation targets as their main identification strategy 3 . The classified regimes in these studies are therefore de jure in nature. The announcement of inflation targets is considered as an important element of the inflation targeting policy, especially when inflation targeting is viewed as a framework in a broad sense 4 .
However, the large literature on exchange rate regimes has shown that policies of 1 See, for example, Friedman (1968) , Bernanke et al. (1999) and Mishkin (1999) . The well-known Taylor rule and variants are also regarded as a monetary policy rule for inflation targeting as suggested in Mishkin (1999) and Svensson (1999 Stone and Bhundia (2004) and the related work of Carare and Stone (2006) are two exceptions and are discussed later. 4 See, for example, Bernanke et al. (2001) and Mishkin (2001) .
many countries in practice may not be consistent with their publicly disclosed regimes. For example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) have identified a number of countries as having "fear of floating" and "hidden pegs". The works of Stone and Bhundia (2004) and Carare and Stone (2006) also find that some countries, named as implicit price stability anchors, manage their monetary policy to maintain low and stable inflation without any announced targets on inflation.
Another group of countries, by contrast, have low credibility to prove the announced inflation targets as their foremost policy objective. Similarly, Mishkin (p.5, 2001 ) also argues that several monetary aggregate targeting countries failed to control inflation because "monetary targeting was not pursued seriously" by these countries.
The literature on exchange rate regimes is probably more extensive and has a longer history. The possible deviation of a country's intervention in foreign exchange markets in practice from its declared, or de jure exchange rate regime is considered in several de facto classifications including Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) . Similar to the inflation targeting literature, however, an alternative monetary policy framework is not well identified in the exchange rate regime literature. The unidentified monetary policy framework for floating exchange rate regimes and non-inflation targeting countries in the two areas of study causes the separation and incompleteness of the analyses in the existing literature. This weakness begins to receive increasing attention in the recent literature, including Rose (2011) and the comments from Mark Gertler in Ball and Sheridan (2005) Section 4 documents the stylized facts of the two classified monetary policy regimes.
The choice of alternative regimes is also explored with a probit model using the panel data. A brief conclusion is offered in section 5.
Methodology
This study covers the post-Bretton Woods period from 1974 to 2009 and the 228 countries reported to the IMF during this period. This results in 7,980 countryyear observations at the most. Upon excluding 3,902 observations with unavailable data for at least one of the classification variables 7 and 161 outliers in the data, the remaining 3,917 observations are classified using the cluster analysis.
Cluster analysis is one of the popular methods used to identify groups of homogeneous observations in the data. Homogeneity between data is quantified with various similarity or distance measures, such as Euclidean distance in the pre-defined classification variables. The clustering technique has been used in a remarkable number of disciplines including archaeology, biology, medicine, psychology and marketing. In economics, Crone (2005) uses the technique to explore economic regions with similar business cycles in the United States. This study is more closely related to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , who applied the cluster analysis to classify observations in different exchange rate regimes.
Hierarchical and k-means clustering are two alternative approaches to perform the cluster analysis. Hierarchical cluster analysis starts from identifying the two closest subjects and grouping them into one cluster. This procedure continues to identify the closest subject to the previous formed cluster successively until all subjects are grouped into a single cluster. Hierarchical cluster analysis is especially useful when the number of clusters is uncertain. This approach, however, assigns subjects to a cluster on a single pass of analysis, which prevents the reevaluation of previous groupings and reassignment of subjects.
This study follows Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , using the k-means cluster analysis, which is an alternative approach that involves repeated attempts to reach an optimal assignment for the classification. The k-means clustering partitions data into pre-specified k groups through iteration and typically involves two steps. In the first step, k observations are selected as the initial centers of clusters and each remaining observation is assigned to a closest cluster center. Cluster centers are then updated with all assigned observations in the cluster and each observation is reassigned to the new closest cluster center in the second step. This step continues iteratively until there is no more reassignment in the current attempt. The number of clusters and classification variables required in the k-means cluster analysis are further discussed later. Monetary targeting is said to be a strategy mostly used in the 1970s. However, many studies including Mishkin (2001) have argued that this strategy was not seriously pursued. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) also suggest that many monetary targeting countries, including the two classical examples of Germany and Switzerland, are better viewed as "hybrid" inflation and monetary targeters. They also comment that "distinction between inflation and money targeting is overstated". Bernanke and Mihov (1997) and Clarida et al. (1998) 
The Monetary Policy Regimes

Classification Variables and Clusters
The definition of "targeting" in monetary policy is not without argument. In some literature, a target variable is understood as a variable that the monetary policy rule responds to. This literature therefore identifies a de facto regime by estimating the significant variables in the central bank's monetary policy reaction function. On the other hand, some literature defines a target (as well as an intermediate target)
variable as the variable in some forms of loss function. To minimize the loss function, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (1999) show that monetary policy may respond to a set of variables other than the target. The first definition of targeting regime using a target variable in monetary policy reaction function, therefore, could be misleading. Neither of these two terminologies could be said to be fully satisfactory 11 .
In this classification, a regime targeting a specific economic variable is defined as in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (1999) . The behavior of various economic variables in alternative monetary policy regimes could be evaluated under a basic New Keynesian model following Galí (2008) 12 , in which the central bank is assumed to follow a simple interest rate rule of the form
to minimize a loss function of 9 For example, see Scott and Symons (1971) . 10 Empirically, a cluster for monetary targeters is not identified in various settings of variables and number of clusters. 11 Discussions on the two alternative definitions could be found in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , Svensson (1999) and the Appendix A in the working paper version of McCallum and Nelson (1999) . 12 Clarida et al. (1999) provide a very comprehensive review of the dynamic New Keynesian model. Clarida et al. (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2005) , on the other hand, present variant approaches for open economies.
where r t , is the nominal interest rate, φ is the coefficient to the current costpush shock and a t is the target variable of the monetary policy. Under the assumption of nominal price rigidities and complete international financial markets 13 , the baseline model can be represented by the following (log-linear) equations for output gap and domestic inflation:
where rr and v t are the constant natural rate of interest and the i.i.d. cost-push shock with zero mean, respectively. The optimal coefficient in the interest rate rule and the volatility of various economic variables under a specific target could be obtained by using the method of undetermined coefficients and dynamic optimization.
In particular, volatility of three variables (interest rate as the instrument variable and exchange rate and inflation as the target variables) in alternative policy regimes are studied and the results are described in Table 1 .
The first two rows show that an economic variable usually has lower volatility when it is targeted. It is also possible for certain economic structures to lead to comparably low volatility in the non-targeted variable as shown in the third row. In all these cases, monetary policy intervention required in the presence of shock leads to comparatively high volatility in the interest rate. Finally, the last row suggests that low volatility of variables may also be a result of a low magnitude of shock, characterized by limited intervention in the interest rate. These four outcomes form the fundamental clusters in the classification procedure. 13 For a small open economy model with uncertainty in the international financial markets, see Leitemo and Söderström (2008) . 
Classification Procedure
This study closely follows the classification procedure in Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) . Technically, this study differs from Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) in two areas to improve performance of the cluster analysis.
14 Using this measure means crawling peg, a policy that allows the exchange rate to change gradually and as planned, is considered as a kind of exchange rate targeting policy. 15 The reference currencies included in the computation are the US dollar, the British pound, the Deutsche Mark, the French franc, the Japanese Yen, the SDR, the ECU and the euro. Other currencies are used for specific countries with reference to Appendix B of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and the list of currency union in Rose (2000) . 16 For example, Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) suggest, "(inflation targets) are typically established for multiple horizons ranging from one to four years." 17 The monthly consumer price index and money market rate are the primary sources of reference to compute the monthly inflation rate and interest rate. Supplementary sources of references are used when the primary source is not available. For example, quarterly consumer price index and retail price index are used for the computation of inflation with appropriate adjustments, while lending rate and monetary policy related interest rate are used as the supplementary measure for interest rate. It is important to stress that the classification result in this study is not sensitive to the use of supplementary sources of references and various definition of classification variables, including the use of short-term or long-term inflation.
It is well known in the cluster analysis literature that k-means algorithms do not necessarily converge to a global optimum. The k-means algorithms may terminate at different local optimums with different specified initial centers. This study uses different sets of random observations instead of one specified set of observations in Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) as the initial center to address the local optimum problem 18 . The set of initial centers that results in the highest similarity measure is adopted. Another problem to be addressed in the k-means cluster analysis relates to the standardization of variables. No matter which distance measure is used, variables are required to be standardized into the same unit of measure. Otherwise, variables with larger values will have a larger impact on the classification. The znormalization is a traditionally-used method for standardization and is used in Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , but several studies show that standardization by range results in consistently superior recovery of the underlying cluster structure 19 . In view of this, classification variables are standardized in this study by their ranges.
The classification procedure in this study is divided into several steps. Kmeans cluster analysis is sensitive to outliers, as they are usually selected as cluster centers. and thus results in outlying clusters with a small number of observations.
Following Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , two percent of the upper tail of observations of each classification variables is removed from the data. These outliers are classified into alternative monetary policy regimes in the later step. The remaining observations are range standardized and classified into the four clusters described in Table 1 . As described in Table 1 In the final step, observations that remain unclassified are further analyzed. In addition to the 1,275 inconclusive observations in the cluster analysis, this also includes the 161 outliers and 3,902 observations with unavailable classification variables that are excluded from the classification procedure. The classification of the 161 outliers is straightforward and most of them can be assigned to one of the cluster centers identified in the cluster analysis with minimum distance. The ad hoc classification of the 1,275 inconclusive observations and 3,902 observations with unavailable variables is based on the methodology of Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) . An observation is assigned to the exchange rate targeting regime if it (i) has zero volatility in the exchange rate, or (ii) is identified as a fixed exchange rate regime by the IMF and has less than 0.1% volatility in the exchange rate. Similar to Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , the 0.1% volatility in the exchange rate places a comfortable buffer from the minimum exchange rate volatility of the inflation targeting regime (which is 0.2%). In this sense, countries without an independent legal tender including members of Euro zone are also classified as exchange rate targeting. The classification procedure is depicted in the Appendix B.
The Classification Result
Comparisons with Other Classifications
The classification has identified 2,957 country-year observations in the exchange rate targeting regime and 1,489 observations in the inflation targeting regime. (1986, 1989, 1992, (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , Finland (1980 Finland ( , 1982 Finland ( -89, 1991 Finland ( -1996 , Norway (1983 Norway ( -84, 1995 Norway ( -2003 and Bostwana (1984 Bostwana ( -86, 1988 Bostwana ( -94, 1997 Bostwana ( -2004 , which are fixed exchange rate regimes in LYS (2005), but inflation targeters in the current study. New
Zealand and Finland are widely agreed inflation targeting countries since the 1990s in the literature. Norway, on the other hand, is not traditionally recognized as an inflation targeter. Stone and Bhundia (2004) , however, find that the country has been using de facto inflation targeting policy (named as implicit price anchor) since late 1990s, and continues to do so after the central bank announced an inflation target in 2001. Of those regimes successfully identified in this study, all of the de facto inflation targeters in Stone and Bhundia (2004) are grouped into the inflation targeting regime in this study as well. A non-negligible proportion of exchange rate anchors in Stone and Bhundia (2004) , on the other hand, is identified as inflation targeters in this study 23 . A possible explanation of this divergence is that Stone and Bhundia (2004) have excluded the exchange rate anchors from their de facto classification procedure.
Instead, they adopted the identification for exchange rate anchors from the IMF classification, which is considered a mixed de jure-de facto approach based on subjective judgment.
A comparison with the de jure or partial de jure classification by the IMF and Fatas et al. (2007) in the lower panel reveals another interesting story. There are no 21 For example, Pula has been adjusted seven times in the 12-year period from 1980 to 1991. Each adjustment ranged from 5% to 15%. Masalila and Motshidisi (2003) , a study of the Bank for International Settlements by two researchers from the Bank of Botswana provides the background of the exchange rate policy of Botswana in more detail. 22 See, for example, Bleaney and Lisenda (2001) and Setlhare (2004) . 23 The de facto inflation targeters in Stone and Bhundia (2004) include the full-fledged integration targeting regime and implicit price stability anchor, while exchange rate anchor comes from nonautonomous (monetary policy) regime and exchange rate peg. Of the 232 inflation targeters classified in Stone and Bhundia (2004) , 20 of them are classified as inconclusive in this study.
"pretended inflation targeters" since all countries announcing inflation targets are also de facto inflation targeters. However, there are quite a large number of "hidden inflation targeters", which describe themselves as fixed exchange rate regimes but target inflation in practice. Unsurprisingly, many of these "hidden inflation targeters" are also classified as "implicit price stability anchors" according to their inflation performance in Stone and Bhundia (2004) . Central bank communications, especially those on the policy target, are widely agreed to be one of the pillars of the inflation targeting framework. The existence of a large number of "hidden inflation targeters"
is therefore an important area for further exploration. Even though an explanation for "hidden inflation targeters" is out of the scope of this study, the study of Morris and Shin (2002) may offer a hint. The main conclusion in Morris and Shin (2002) and subsequent follow-ups in Svensson (2006) and Morris et al. (2006) is that central bank communications could reduce social welfare in some special circumstances, including the case of imprecise information. This explanation is consistent with the fact that a larger share of the "hidden inflation targeters" comes from the pre-1990s period when central bank information is likely less precise than the later period.
An Interpretation of the Monetary History
The number and percentage of classified regimes in various periods from 1974 to 2009 are presented in Table 4 . Generally speaking, the figures are consistent with the impression that inflation targeting has been emerging as a more typical strategy in the past few decades. Exchange rate targeting, on the other hand, is still common, but its share has been diminishing since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Most The classification supports the argument of Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) that the two self-described monetary targeters, Germany and Switzerland, share many similarities with other countries using inflation targeting. For most yearly data, these two countries are classified as de facto inflation targeters. The euro area is not considered a single entity in the classification procedure, but the monetary strategy of the European Central Bank should be an interesting case for discussion. Using out-of-sample classification, the European Central Bank has been adopting inflation targeting since its inception 24 .
The Two Monetary Policy Regimes
Stylized Facts
Stylized facts of the two monetary policy regimes are described in Table 5 based on the simple averages of two groups. The result could be interpreted together with similar studies in Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) , Husain et al. (2005) and the survey by Tavlas et al. (2008) for the exchange rate regimes; Rose (2007), Ball and Sheridan (2005) and the survey by Walsh (2009) for the inflation targeting regimes. Unlike these studies, the two alternative monetary policy regimes are wellidentified for comparison in this study. The duration of a regime is measured as the mean of the average number of years a country maintains the regime to avoid the overrepresentation of countries with frequent regime changes. As shown in the upper panel of Table 5 , the exchange rate targeting regime is significantly more durable than the inflation targeting regime in the full sample. This result is found to be mainly affected by the extreme durable peg of several small and developing countries as well as countries in the currency union 25 .
The difference in duration ceases to exist in the sample of advanced and emerging countries, which is more comparable to the results in Husain et al. (2005) and Rose (2007) .
The crisis tally of the two regimes is calculated with the financial crisis database from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) . The two regimes show no significant difference in the occurrence of crisis in the sample of all countries and advanced countries. Exchange rate targeting in emerging countries, by contrast, reports a significantly higher crisis statistics. This result is in line with the finding in Husain et al. (2005) and is consistent with the observation of more sudden stops of capital flows for non-inflation targeters in Rose (2007) 26 .
As for the economic performance of two monetary policy regimes, the results generally support Husain et al. (2005) , that exchange rate targeting regime has a higher unconditional average economic growth, inflation rate and lower exchange rate volatility. The growth rate in real GDP per capita is higher for exchange rate targeting regime, but the difference is not significant in advanced and emerging countries. The result on the inflation rate level is consistent across various subsamples but is found to be affected by a few hyperinflation observations in the exchange rate targeting regime. Once the hyperinflation data is removed, the inflation levels of the two regimes are more comparable and the differences in all countries become insignificant.
Who Targets Inflation?
The choice of monetary policy regimes is itself endogenous and depends on economic structures. Literature attempts to identify the structural differences between inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters, including Gerlach (1999) and Carare and Stone (2006) . Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) , on the other hand, empirically estimated 25 The duration for countries in currency unions is found to be extremely long, with an average of 24 years. Excluding currency unions from the exchange rate, targeting regime reduces its average duration from 9.58 years to 5.25 years. The difference remains significant at 5% level. 26 See, for example, Calvo et al. (2006) for the relationship between a sudden stop of capital flow and crisis in emerging economies.
the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes using variables with stronger theoretical support. The lower panel of Table 5 presents the key variables used in Levy- Yeyati et al. (2010) for the two monetary policy regimes. The size of the economy as represented by the real GDP, trade openness and concentration, captures the importance of trade aspects suggested by the optimal currency area. Capital openness, as measured by the total flows of portfolio investments as a share of GDP, is the main proxy in the financial theory, which argues a stable exchange rate is preferable to avoid currency mismatch in financial assets and liabilities. The variable of years in office is the number of years that the incumbent administration has been in office.
According to the sustainability hypothesis in the political theory, a weak government (as indicated by fewer years in office) is difficult to sustain a fixed exchange rate. This argument is even stronger when inflation targeting is identified as the alternative monetary policy regime since inflation, different from the exchange rate, is nontradable and therefore not subject to speculation.
The choice of inflation targeting regime is estimated by a probit regression using panel data with random effects, and the results are presented in Table 6 . The results generally mirror the findings in Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) . Consistent with the simple averages measured in the lower panel of Table 5 , models ( The estimation result of model (2) Model (4) aims to explore the determinants for an inflation targeter to formally adopt a de jure inflation targeting regime (in many cases, with the announcement of an inflation target). The sample is therefore largely reduced to observations that are identified as de facto inflation targeters and included in the data set from Fatas et al. (2007) . The result shows that inflation targeters of smaller size and with lower trade concentration are more likely to explicitly establish an inflation target. The significance of the lagged inflation rate level in the estimation also supports several comments made in the literature that a central bank usually announces a formal inflation target after it successfully controls inflation to a lower level and establishes its credibility in fighting inflation.
Conclusion
Existing literature on the evaluation of alternative monetary policy regimes is separate in the areas of exchange rate arrangements and inflation targeting strategy.
The absence of a well-defined regime for a floating exchange rates and non-inflation targeters makes the assessment of a specific monetary policy strategy less convincing. 
